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"When there are people dying from famine • • • /J.nrf/ 
you do not issue the stores of your granaries for 
them ••• and you say, 'It is not owing to me; it 
is owing to the year,' in what does this differ from 
stabbing a man and killing him, and then saying, 'It 
was not I; it was the weapon?'" 
-- Mencius (372-289 B.C.) 
to King Hui of Laing 
"I support establishing a national· policy for 
protecting good agricultural land." 
John R. Block, Secretary 
of Agriculture, 1981 
" ••• I believe the need for conservation of our 
natural resources and the preservation of prime 
agricultural land for agricultural use must take a 
high priority during the 1980s." 
- - James B. Boillot, Director 
of Agriculture, State of 
Missouri, 1981 
Most Americans entered the decade of the 1980s with an honest sense of 
reality. They knew our nation, and indeed the whole western world, was facing 
sterner times. They were ready to admit that hopes must sometimes be bridled 
and that horizons have limits, even ours. 
The contrast with a decade before is incisive and instructive. In 1970 
our citizens were preoccupied with the Vietnam quagmire but their unease did not 
extend to questioning national purpose or destiny. Still lying ahead, unfore-
seen,were the corn blight, devaluation of the U.S. dollar, the Soviets' raid 
on our grain stocks, OPEC's cartelizing of oil pri ces, and even our runaway 
inflation. 
But those shocks and others came in the 1970s. They jolted our confidence. 
They shook us up. Nor are they any longer seen as isolated, temporary, quickly 
passing. On the contrary, we now know the scene has changed. 
So,to repeat, we marched into the 1980s chastened and sobered. And that 
is good. 
Paper opening -~discussion of "U. S. Agriculture and the World Food Economy," 
Recognition of Excellence seminar, University of Missouri-Columbia, April 7, 1981. 
Whether we are prepared to take the next step and respond wisely is a 
different matter. It is also, as the line goes, "why we are here." 
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Surely accurate understanding precedes prudent action. To improve our 
understanding is the obiect of this paper and the three by distinguished UMC 
scientists that follow. 
The Danger of Attempted Withdrawal 
Disturbing events of the last ten years have in common that they respect 
no national boundaries. Many are international in origin, such as the OPEC 
petroleum trade, or shared with trading neighbors, such as inflation. 
Traditionally, Americans have withdrawn from problems having a foreign 
taint, as reflexively as from a hot stove. Anyone of my vintage can attest 
thereto. My education began just after World War I. All pupils learned first 
the Pledge of Allegiance and second President Washington's farewell admonition 
to the American people to stay out of entangling foreign alliances. In reality 
the teaching was inaccurate. The exact language was that we should "steer 
clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world." Somehow 
in our instruction the softer adjective "permanent" was lost and replaced by 
"entangling." 
Presidents Harding and Coolidge governed by the precept of avoiding 
alliances, entangling or otherwise. Then came the isolation of the Depression 
years, when we sought to solve our internal problems by erecting external barriers 
Trade was stifled. Secretary of State Cordell Hull got us to loosen trade a bit 
but it remained for the Japanese to instruct Americans that we are a part of the 
world. They did so December 7, 1941. Never since have we allowed ourselves the 
delusion of disinvolvement. 
Nonetheless, old reflexes persist. Just now we are flirting with the 
impulse to run from trouble, even though the thinking lobes of our brains tell 
us there is no place to run to. American citizens in their frustration are 
begging to retrench, both domestically and internationally. They said so with 
their votes last fall. The officials they elected, more disposed to acquiesce 
than to importune, are pulling in U. S. horns. The national posture of the 
moment is to disengage, to withdraw. 
The wish may be natural but the cause is futile. The United States cannot 
stay aloof. The option is not open. Apart from moral and political ties with 
the rest of the world, and apart too from obvious communication linkage as 
Borneo connects with Boston by satellite, the United States has joined in 
heightened interdependence among nations. 
Much of the interdependence is coldly economic. An example is our depen-
dence on imported minerals to keep not only our manufacturing industry going 
but our modern agriculture too. In addition to our advertised appetite for 
imported oil we draw on imports for 93 percent of our bauxite (for aluminum), 
l Papers by Douglas Ensminger, John Milton Poehlman, and Earnest R. Sears. 
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81 percent of our tin, 77 percent of the nickel we use, 50 percent of tungsten, 
29 percent of iron ore, and 19 percent of copper. For agriculture we import 
from Canada a sizable part of the potash for fertilizer nutrients, and before 
long we will have to get more of our phosphate from Morocco. 
Our agriculture also depends on the rest of the world for markets. And 
although we may rejoice in how burgeoning export demand benefits at least part 
of our agriculture, the associated cost is a heightened sensitivity to economic 
and political developments beyond our shores. In view of our national history 
this side effect is not welcomed. I stress that both economics and politics 
are involved. 
At last fall's Agricultural Outlook Conference Carol Tucker Foreman, 
then Assistant USDA Secretary, warned of the vulnerability of export markets to 
world events: 
We are fooling ourselves if we think it possible over the next 
several years to avoid the foreign policy implications of our 
food exports. Further, we must understand that we are not the 
only actors on the world scene ••.• We cannot make the blithe 
assumption that ••• statistical projections will be translated 
automatically into stable, dependable markets abroad. 
In the past, farmers only had to worry about weather, pests, and 
irate American consumers. They are now vulnerable to the even 
more capricious pressures of palace intrigue in unpronounceable 
foreign capitals .•.• It is clear that food export policy must 
go hand-in-hand with diplomacy. 2 
In March of this year Agriculture Secretary Block echoed the same theme. 
Applauding cooperative business-government "ventures" abroad he declared, "it 
is important to recognize that our agricultural trade development projects with 
other nations will be linked to our relations with those countries." By 
"relations" he meant "evidence of support for the goals and objectives of the 
United States;" in other words, political accord. 5 
Language such as that used by Mrs. Foreman and Secretary Block bring to 
mind the debate about using food as a weapon. The coinage is understandable 
yet unfortunate. It suggests that the political role of food is solely negative, 
even punitive. On balance our food resources serve better to woo friends than 
to spank enemies. During four days in Egypt last summer I learned a fact of 
international life, that our ally Anwar Sadat holds his strong position as 
President of Egypt partly by virtue of th~ P. L. 48o wheat we make available to 
him. Our wheat baked into cheap bread for Cairo's unemployed is essential to 
economic and political stability in the country. We want Mr. Sadat strong and 
on our side. U.S. wheat helps. 
2 
3 
Carol Tucker Foreman, "Food and Agriculture Policy in the 198os," 
Nov. 20, 1980, p. 5. 
USDA, 
John R. Block, remarks before the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, 
March 4, 1981. 
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Although we declare that our nation is deeply and irrevocably involved 
internationally, we also admit some loss of influence. That trend too is 
irreversible. Professor Tillema of our political science department commented 
at the UMC-Perry seminar last fall that even as our nation has become more 
internationally oriented it has lost some of its earlier "capacity to shape 
international events." We are still a great power, stronger than any other, 
but we can't make everyone dance to our tune. Therefore, "in order to protect 
our interests we must play the game of international politics," even as other 
natious do, and with "all the risks of costs and failures" that go with that 
game. 
Seeing through a Glass Darkly 
My final opening note is a precautionary caveat. The analysis that follows 
relates primarily to the outlook for world trade in farm products and especially 
the grains, and our likely place in it. The best available information will be 
summarized. But knowledge is always an exercise in probabilities. The most 
likely prospect for the 1980s is that the world will compete for our grain and 
other farm products, that domestic consumers will insist on having their wants 
met (or will try to do so), and that the decade will be marked by more instances 
of relative scarcity than of burdensome surplus. To repeat, this is the most 
likely prospect. 
But it is far from certain, assured. Not only can developments be affected 
by the palace intrigues Mrs. Foreman whimsically refers to. There can also be 
casualties in demand, or unexpected developments in production (positive or 
negative), or perhaps even international conflict. Events of these kinds can 
upset not only the best-laid plans of men but their prognostications. In 
statistical language, there is a sizable error term to all the observations that 
will be made henceforth. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary to be precisely accurate to set 
forth how dramatically the overall outlook can affect the future course of events 
at home and abroad. Put succinctly, whether or not the actual situation will be 
one of comparative scarcity or of a return to surpluses is a matter of immense 
meaning. If surpluses were to recur we would go back to old debates about land 
retirement, export subsidies, and such. But if shortages persist we will face 
new issues. 
Our past experience has prepared us better for surpluses than for shortages. 
To be sure, if shortages were mild and brief we could rely on business-as-usual. 
But persistent shortages would lead to a three-way tug-of-war among claimants 
for our food- and feedstuffs. One is the new export demand, amplified by the 
diplomatic overtones mentioned above. The second is U. s. consumers, who will 
clamor for secure access to food supply. Third is a new arrival on the scene, 
one that is welcome during surplus but potentially annoying during shortage, 
namely, diversion of feed grains to ethanol. 
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Data bearing on these possible panoramas will be presented below. 
Herbert K. Tillema, "America and the World, 1980," in International Affairs 
and U. S. Agriculture, Univ. of Missouri-Columbia, Agr. Exp. Station Special 
Report 259, 1986, p. 13. 
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The Export Boom 
A starting point is the boom during the 1970s in exports of U.S. farm 
products. The chart below tells the story. The export value in 1979-80 (year 
ending September 30) was $40 billion. During the 1970s the value multiplied 
approximately five times. The increase is attributable about equally to larger 
volume and higher prices. 
The great bulk of exports is commercial. Concessional sales, primarily 
made under P. L. 480, stayed at around five percent of the total. 
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All farm products joined in the gain in export values during the 1970s. 
But the food and feed grains and soybeans were in the lead and they now account 
for two-thirds the value of all farm products exported. These products will be 
at the center of future export policy. 
Changes in export destinations are noteworthy. For the grains the charts 
below compare destinations in 1979-80 with those of 1970-71, Although all 
markets increased their buying, the traditional markets of Japan, Canada, and 
Western Europe lost ground relatively. Latin America took a larger share in 
1979-80, as did Southeast Asia; but the really big gain was in sales to centrally 
controlled economies, principally the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China. 
DESTINATIONS OF U. S. GRAIN EXPORTS 
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Many factors underlay the uptrend in exports of U.S. farm products. At 
our 198o UMC-Perry seminar Professors Womack and Bredahl listed several con-
tributing causes and they took particular note of increased trade with Eastern 
Europe. They specifically cited "decisions in centrally planned economies to 
increase meat SUJ?I!_lies to consumers; ••. /y, neif U.S. policy that encouraged 
exports to {j,hos~ economies beginning in the early seventies; .•• and the 
current U. S. farm program based on a managed buffer stock policy. 11 5 
Devaluation of the U.S. dollar early in the 1970s definitely added to 
trade with countries whose currencies remained relatively strong. Consumer 
demand for meat increased also in Western Europe and some other developed countries, 
contributing to growing exports of feed grains and soybeans. 
which are 
In developing nations of the Third World,/major markets for our wheat and 
rice, rising export trade is explained more by an urgent need for food. There 
the cereals are consumed directly. Those nations buy approximately half our 
exports of the two grains; and, contrary to popular impression, they pay hard 
dollars for the largest part of their purchases. (Some get their dollars by 
borrowing from private banks and international lending agencies, however; and 
their pyramiding debt structure is a disturbing element in the trade outlook.) 
5 Abner W. Womack and Maury Bredahl, "The World Dimension to U. S. Agricultural 
Trade," in International Affairs and U. S. Agriculture, Univ. of Missouri-
Columbia, Agr. Exp. Station Special Report 259, 1986, p. 19. 
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Not least among factors involved in our exports are shortfalls in agri-
cultural production worldwide. It is not that agricultural economies stagnate; 
all show continued gains in output. But yields do not keep up with need. 
The charts below present the world picture dramatically. In the left hand 
chart annual consumption and production of feed grains are shown for all countries 
of the world outside the United States. Manifestly, the gap between consumption 
and production has widened steadily. Professor Womack estimates that the deficit 
increases by more than two million metric tons each year, or almost 100 million 
bushels. The United States has filled that gap. Translated into acreage, a 
million more acres of corn, sorghums, and other feed grains are required each 
year to supply that quantity of grain for export -- assuming only slow trends 
in per-acre yields. 
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For wheat the situation is less critical. However, the two good-harvest 
years of 1976 and 1978 obscure the slow worsening of the wheat supply-demand 
balance in the world outside the United States. According to Professor Womack, 
longer trends indicate that on the average the world will draw on the United 
States for about 35 million more bushels of wheat each year. 
The story for soybeans is similar to that for feed grains. If anything, 
the United States position is even more strategic for soybeans than for the 
grains, as we are by far the largest supplier of beans and their products into 
foreign trade. 
Feedback Effect on the U. S. Food Economy 
It has been politically popular to rejoice in the big growth in agricultural 
exports. Grain and soybean farmers have seen it as underpinning the price structure 
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for their products. The dollar exchange earned by those exports has helped to 
bolster the U.S. dollar in the face of rising costs of petroleum imports. 
But there are negative factors too. Clearly, every increase in price 
received by feed grain and soybean farmers has constituted a matching increase 
in cost to livestock and poultry producers. Animal agriculture, heralded after 
World War II as savior to farmers and blessing to consumers, has lapsed into 
comparative shadows. We have been loath to admit how much the growing export 
trade has detracted from our livestock and poultry operations. The statistical 
fact of the matter is that very nearly all the increase in production of grains 
and soybeans the last 10 years has moved into export channels. The two charts 
below show clearly the uptrend in crop production but near-stability in live-
stock output, and the very slow growth in quantity of feed concentrates fed. 
More feed has not been fed at home because export demand has bid it away. 
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The chart on the next page reveals that as a consequence the average con-
sumption of animal products has stayed about level for more than 10 years. Even 
as Eastern and Western Europeans have moved toward more animal foods in their 
diets, we have eaten more crop products. 
80 
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Whether U. S. consumers have changed their dietary habits because of 
changing preferences -- witness the aversion to breakfast eggs -- or have re-
luctantly responded to price signals is a moot question. Probably both factors 
have been at work. However, the protests raised occasionally against high prices 
of beef suggest that not all dietary changes have been voluntary and welcome. 
And in a nation that formerly regarded foods of animal origin as superior and 
mark of a good life, the retrenchment carries a meaning -- and perhaps a portent. 
Grain for Fuel 
Something relatively new under the farm-policy sun is the increasing 
diversion of feed grains into ethanol and the grand ambitions sometimes expressed. 
A year ago the farm community felt high excitement. There was enthusiasm about 
home distillation as hedge against scarce motor fuels. Following the embargo on 
shipping over-quota grain to the Soviet Union, many farmers endorsed commercial 
production of ethanol from grain (for gasohol) for its market-strengthening effect. 
Ardors have since cooled a bit. Stills have not worked too well. Ethanol 
remains non-competitive with even higher priced gasoline, and its production still 
rests on subsidy. But the soberest reflections on potential use of grain for 
fuel reveal the piercing contrast between how much even a modest ethanol program 
could disturb the present market equilibrium in agriculture, and how little even 
a large program would contribute to the energy supply. 
Bluntly put, grain is not an e~onomically sound alternate source of motor 
fuel. Other biological materials that are not themselves foodstuffs are a more 
promising alternative energy source. In l98o some 8o-l00 million bushels of 
lO 
corn went into manufacture of ethanol. The product of about one million acres, 
that quantity provided about 200 million gallons of ethanol. But we use more 
than lOO billion gallons of gasoline each year, not to mention diesel as a 
second fuel. Hence the million acres of corn contributed one fifth of one per-
cent of the motor gasoline supply of last year. 
Former President Carter advocated building capacity to produce lO billion 
gallons of ethanol. A yearly output of that scale would require half the 
U. S. corn crop. Granted, distillers' grains would be recovered as a byproduct, 
but even so the consequence to both our corn export trade and our livestock/ 
poultry industry would be devastating. And that big a program would supply 
less than a tenth of all motor fuel needs and would amount to only two percent 
of the total energy supply. 
It is possible that many U. s. citizens, pressed to get fuel for their 
automobiles, boats, and lawnmowers, will o~t to put corn-alcohol into those 
motors and bread and rice (instead of meat) into their own stomachs. Rarely, 
though, will the issue be expressed in those terms. The easy assumption is 
that we can have both ethanol and meat, not to mention continuing to export 
farm products. The chances of such a felicitous outcome are very small. 
A modest ethanol program could be accepted rather readily but grandiose 
schemes would pose a major policy problem. They would do so because they would 
almost certainly put agriculture into a shortage mileau and claimants on farm 
output into contention. As stated above, we are experienced in dealing with 
surpluses but chronic shortage can throw us into a tailspin. 
Prospects for More Production 
Before elaborating on policy issues for the future I will touch briefly 
on prospects for increased agricultural production. 
Wonderful achievements in increasing food production in nearly all countries 
have been a heartening experience of the last generation or two. They have made 
it possible for a steadily growing world population to be fed without recurring 
or widespread famines. Admittedly, many hundreds of millions continue to live 
on a diet of minimum adequacy. But the overall record is not bad. 
In developing nations a third of the increase in agricultural output is 
attributed to expansion of cultivated area. In developed nations virtually all 
the increase has come from a combination of new technology and new resources --
mainly motor fuel, fertilizer, other chemicals. Most of these newer resources 
are derived from fossil fuels. As fossil fuel sources become scarcer and more 
costly, grave dilemmas are posed. 
Already in the United States, one recourse has been to add to cultivated 
acreage. Yet most surveys show that we have only a small reserve of land that 
can be cultivated without severe problems of conservation, while at the same time 
good farmland is steadily lost to nonfarm uses. In its l977 Potential Cropland 
Study the Soil Conservation Service estimated that only 127 million acres have a 
high or medium potential for addition to cropland. Of this only 36 million acres 
could be converted readily. The SCS also believes that three million acres of 
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rural land are lost to non-agricultural uses each year and that almost a third 
is prime agricultural land.6 
Whether another round of explosive new technology can somehow be induced 
or invented, sparing mankind the perils of inadequate food supply, is a 
question better left to the two agronomists honored at this seminar, Dr. Poehlman 
and Dr. Sears. For my part I am impressed by the statistic that of the solar 
energy falling on a corn field only one percent is constituted in the harvested 
grain. Somehow it should be possible to do better. 
There is yet another facet to estimates of potential production. The new 
technology and new nonfarm inputs that have revolutionized farming in the United 
States and many other places have a distinctive cultural pattern: they are 
capital-intensive. So-called modern technology rests on and glorifies intensive 
use of capital inputs ranging from steel in machines to electric power to pet-
roleum in its many forms. 
This kind of agriculture is labor-extensive. It is also somewhat land-
extensive. Its goal and highest achievement has been to lift output per man 
to impressive levels. It has not maximized output per acre or in total. 
An agriculture of such a make-up was long appropriate to the United States, 
where industrial materials could be made available at unbelievably low cost. 
It was economic to use machines that burned fuel by the barrel. Also, in a 
nation with immense land resources, and one where annual output tended to out-
run markets, it was defensible to confine the land in cultivation to fJat or 
gently sloping expanses where those big machines could turn a long furrow, and 
where costs of protecting soil from surface damage could be kept small. 
In short, the United States has been under no pressure to maximize util-
ization of its land or farm labor, or its total output. 
Pressures of the future will force a turn-about. Although we will not 
revert to horse and mule farming or human drudgery, the imperious trend will be 
toward a somewhat more land-intensive and labor-intensive agriculture. This 
means bringing into cultivation tracts of land that do not accommodate huge 
machines, or that require soil conserving practices to protect them. It also 
means servicing smaller and diversified farms, thus slowing the trend toward 
ever larger monoculture units. 
Intensification of our agriculture could add significantly to total out-
put. I have said often, only half facetiously, that Japanese farmers could feed 
Columbia by farming the median of Interstate 70. The image is not too far 
fetched. 
The same moral about cultural practices can be applied to our teaching of 
farmers in other nations, particularly those of the Third World. In past years 
much of our technical aid has featured transfer of our variety of technology. 
Highlight has been the techniques of the Green Revolution. But the majority 
of the world's farmers are small operators for whom expensive nonfarm inputs 
6 Potential Cropland Study, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation 
Service, Statistical Bulletin No. 578, 1977. 
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are uneconomic, especially at rising prices. They need help with ordinary 
techniques, not more capital-intensification. 
Implications for Policy 
If the future should bring back a surplus situation in agriculture, policy 
issues will not be absent but the territory will be familiar. 
Not so if the future truly will be one of relative shortages. The terrain 
will be unfamiliar indeed. Although it is tempting to suggest that the "market" 
will do all allocating of resources and distributing of product, sparing us the 
travail of policy decisions, the grim reality is not so reassuring. Policy 
decisions already are deeply involved in our agriculture and agricultural trade. 
New policy contentions are inescapable. I touch on a few. 
Terms of international trading are surely a candidate for controversy. 
Will trade henceforth be essentially multilateral or bilateral? We subscribe 
to the former but in the last five years have entered into three bilateral 
agreements for grain trade. Each agreement is justified on grounds of being 
unique and not precedent-setting. A new Soviet agreement might be signed in 
1981. 
If grain proves to be abundant we can live with part-multilateral, part-
bilateral trade policy. If grain is scarce, my prediction is that we cannot. 
During a period of scarcity our old reliable (and politically friendly) export 
buyers will clamor for bilateral protection of their access to our stores. It 
will not be strategically possible to deny them. 
Moreover, multilateral trading is a policy but bilateral involves agree-
ments. If we bilaterally commit ourselves to export specified volumes of 
grain a problem arises of holding reserve stocks to ensure fulfillment. The 
present farmers' reserve program, although well designed in some respects, 
could readily prove incapable of meeting heavy demands on it. One proposal is 
to set up a separate export-contract reserve. 
At this point I offer a personal interpretation that presses ever harder 
on my mental retina. It seems to me that old tradition and new paradigm in 
international trade are in conflict. Traditionally, world buyers of farm 
products have looked on imports as residual supplements to domestic food sources, 
and sellirs have regarded exports as residual disposal of domestic surplus. Year 
by year/paradigm emerges wherein buyers seek dependable if not pre-schedulable 
sources, and sellers want equally reliable outlets. The contrast between the 
old tradition and new paradigm is obvious. In the newer setting nations grope 
to modify their institutions of trade. 
Policy topic two is non-commercial trade relations. These may be no more 
facile than the commercial. For a quarter century concessionary trade and 
technical aid have been extended for the multiple purposes of helping people, 
winning or keeping friends, and strengthening our markets. When grain is plenti-
ful programs are readily, even enthusiastically, supported. When grain is scarce, 
the impulse is to retrench. But pervasive world tensions give cause to preserve 
these instruments of our world role. 
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Priority to Our Consumers? 
A third policy topic is the consideration to be shown our own citizens 
in the event of relative shortages and competitive grasping for available 
supply. Do we first provide for "our own"? An attractive feature of an 
export-reserve program, mentioned above, is that it would facilitate a two-
price policy -- a different price for exports than for domestic use. During 
the 1950s and 1960s when surpluses were our burden export buyers often bought 
at discount. We subsidized exports. During a future shortage it is con-
ceivable that export buyers will be charged a premium. 
Fourthly I turn to the touchy issue of use of energy -- the so-called 
biomass debate. Ethanol is as much a product of subsidy as of corn. As 
energy becomes scarcer and more costly pressure will intensify to convert farm 
products to the alcohols. But resistance will be thrown up as food supplies 
diminish. There is no way to avoid a confrontation. 
Fifth and sixth on my list are policy issues h~ring on capacity to 
produce.How much and what kind of support will we/g~ciresearch and accompanying 
education? Some scientists allege a tight connection between level of research 
in production technology and level of gross farm output. The claim may be a 
bit smug. Even so, I have previously sounded an alarm regarding not just the 
downward drift in research funding but the gradual shift to a contractual system 
of funding. Does contractual funding promise c9ntinuity in a combined basic-
and-applied research program? I doubt it does. 
The final policy area is soul searching indeed. It relates to protection 
of our resource of productive land. In the United States we still hold to a 
pioneer philosophy of land. According to it, land is abundant, and once occupied 
it is eligible for protection or plundering as the title-holder sees fit. The 
philosophy is outdated and cannot survive; for if its worst features survive, 
human beings will not. Protection of our good farmland from every threat is 
an undeniable injunction for our national future. This applies to potential 
damage from water and wind, chemical saturation, loss to non-farm uses, and 
even inappropriate cropping patterns. 
A retinue of policy issues such as those just sketched with their many 
international complications invites our old reflex of denial and disengagement. 
We may dream that energy will again be plentiful and cheap. We may imagine that 
open prairies still await the pioneer's plow. We might even suppose that 
George Washington's injunction against alliances, entangling or otherwise, can 
be adhered to. 
A few years ago a librettist for light opera pled, "Stop the world: I 
want to get off." The wish may be natural but gravity prevents its fulfillment. 
A pull akin to gravity surrounds the place of the United States in the world food 
trade. We can't pull loose from it, however great be our desire. 
7 Harold F. Breimyer, "Education in Public Policy: Eight Years of the UMC-Perry 
Foundation Seminar," in International Affairs and U.S. Agriculture, Univ. of 
Missouri-Columbia,Agr. Exp. Station Special Report 259, 1980, p. 57. 
We can't detach ourselves because we are human beings possessed of 
sympathy, and we can't do so for the further reason that our security is 
interconnected with that of peoples from Greenland to Singapore. But lest 
this be too grim an ending to this paper, let's rejoice that food is our 
resource in relation to both our own and other populations. It touches 
humanity deeply, and our food-producing capacity is a source of strength 
at home and in world affairs. 
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